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We empirically study personal norms of sustainability, conceptualized according to the norm-
activation theory and operationalized under the notion of strong ecological-economic 
sustainability, for commercial cattle farmers in semi-arid rangelands of Namibia, a system 
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determinants, and analyze their impact on actual management based on the dual-preferences 
model. We find personal norms of sustainability that are heterogeneous across farmers, but 
vary little with socio-demographic or environmental characteristics. We find no evidence for a 
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farmers not feeling capable for averting adverse long-term consequences of their 
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1. Introduction 
Sustainability is often viewed as a moral obligation to “pass on a world of undiminished life 
opportunities to members of future generations” (Howarth, 2007: 656) (Solow, 1993). As 
such, sustainability is a norm which is an independent determinant of individual behavior 
besides egoistic preferences and the opportunity set (Brekke et al., 2003; Young, 2008; Young 
and Burke, 2010). More specifically, it is a type of norms that determines behavior affecting 
the well-being of others through changes in the environment (Harland et al., 1999; Stern, 
2000; Nordlund and Garvill, 2002). A crucial aspect of norms is that people are not bound to 
comply. People may have distinct norms but might not be aware of adverse, interpersonal 
consequences of their behavior or might not belief themselves capable of averting these 
consequences (Schwartz, 1973, 1977; Stern et al., 1999), and thus act as if these norms were 
non-existent. In this paper, we empirically characterize norms of sustainability for the case 
study of commercial cattle farming in semi-arid rangelands of Namibia, study their 
determinants, and analyze their impact on actual management behavior.  
Previous studies on norms that determined environmentally significant behavior, such as 
recycling (e.g. Hopper and Nielsen, 1991; Thogersen, 1999), waste reduction (e.g. Thogersen, 
1999) or renewable energy consumption (e.g. Ek and Söderholm, 2008) often equate these 
norms with norms of sustainability. However, it remains questionable whether this equation is 
valid as important aspects of sustainability are not explicitly clarified, such as what specific 
notion of sustainability is employed or whether the behavior at hand targets indeed 
sustainability. Furthermore, the typically studied economic actors are consumers, which may 
not be the ideal objects for studying norms of sustainability. Consumer behavior is only 
indirectly linked to the environment, while the direct impact on the environment is exerted by 
production, in particular in agriculture. 
In this paper, we properly conceptualize, operationalize and analyze norms of sustainability. 
We conceptualize norms according to the norm-activation theory (Schwartz, 1973, 1977). 
Accordingly, sustainability may be viewed as an abstract social norm from which individuals 
derive concrete personal norms of sustainability which are heterogeneous across individuals. 
These personal norms provide guidance on how to act sustainably in specific situations only if 
they are activated, i.e. if individuals are aware of conditions that entail adverse consequences 
for others and feel capable for averting these consequences. We operationalize personal norms 
under the notion of strong ecological-economic sustainability (Pearce et al., 1989; Daly et al., 
1994; Ekins et al., 2003; Baumgärtner and Quaas, 2009). For sustainability of an ecological-  3
economic system, it is important to maintain both the condition of the ecosystem, so that it 
may continue to provide essential services to humans, and to maintain the income of the 
actors, so that their livelihood is secured (Baumgärtner and Quaas, 2009). Accordingly, we 
examine two specific personal norms of sustainability which are the level at or above which 
ecosystem quality should be sustained (“personal ecosystem norm”) and the level at or above 
which income should be sustained (“personal income norm”). We analytically relate these 
personal norms to behavior using the dual-preferences model (Brekke et al., 2003; Conlin et 
al., 2003; Young and Burke, 2010). Herein, they constitute an independent determinant of 
behavior besides egoistic preferences, and are traded-off against egoistic preferences by a 
non-negative weighting factor. This factor may be interpreted as the activation of the personal 
norm: if the factor is positive (zero) then the norm impacts (does not impact) on behavior 
since it is activated (not activated). 
We chose commercial cattle farming in semi-arid rangelands of Namibia as a case study since 
we previously identified critical components for the system’s sustainability (Quaas et al., 
2007; Olbrich et al., 2011c; Quaas and Baumgärtner, 2011), among them the aforementioned 
condition of the ecosystem and the income of farmers. Furthermore, farmers as the main 
economic actors are closely linked to the environment. Namibian rangelands suffer from 
degradation in the form of bush encroachment where the historical coexistence of grass and 
bush vegetation is replaced by a dense bush vegetation (de Klerk, 2004). Bush encroachment 
does not only impair the ecosystem’s condition, such as by reducing biodiversity (e.g. Griffin, 
1998; Maggs et al., 1998), but also severely reduces farmer’s income as it limits cattle 
production. It is frequently hypothesized that inadequate farm management contributes to 
bush encroachment (de Klerk, 2004).  
Against this background, we pursue the following research questions: 1) What personal 
ecosystem and income norms can be found among commercial cattle farmers in Namibia? 2) 
What determines these norms? 3) Do these norms impact on actual management? We 
approach these questions empirically based on a large-scale, representative mail survey of 
1.916 farmers that we conducted in August 2008 (Olbrich et al., 2009). Herein, we elicited 
personal ecosystem and income norms, management employed by farmers as well as socio-
demographic and environmental characteristics.  
We find firstly that farmers have personal ecosystem and income norms that are 
heterogeneous across individuals. Secondly, these norms are independent of each other and 
vary only little with socio-demographic or environmental characteristics. Thirdly and most   4
importantly, we find no evidence for a significant impact of personal norms on actual 
management. Thus, suggests that the weighting factors of the dual-preferences model are 
zero, indicating that the personal norms of sustainability are not activated. We hypothesize 
that personal norms are not activated because farmers do not feel capable of averting adverse 
long-term management consequences and thus do not pursue sustainable management.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the conceptual background of our 
analysis – norm-activation theory, notion of sustainability, system description and dual-
preferences model. Section 3 describes the methods used to collect and analyze our data. 
Results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 discusses and concludes.  
2. Conceptual background 
2.1 Norm-activation theory 
Several approaches have been developed to conceptualize norms, which may broadly be 
divided into two strands. The first strand views norms as “a standard, customary, or ideal 
form of behavior to which individuals in a social group try to conform” (Young and Burke, 
2010), and thus views norms to be homogenous across individuals within a population (Elster 
J., 1989; Hausman and McPherson, 2006; Young and Burke, 2010).  
The second strand emphasizes the individual nature of norms, which are viewed to be 
heterogeneous across individuals (Schwartz, 1973; Ajzen, 1991). In order to account for 
individual differences in norms we follow this second strand, and more specifically, the norm-
activation theory (Schwartz, 1973, 1977). This theory was originally developed to explain 
social behavior, where “other people are directly affected by the consequences of one’s 
behavioral choices” (Harland et al., 1999: 2508). It has been extended to environmentally 
significant behavior that indirectly affects others through “[changing] the availability of 
materials or energy from the environment or [altering] the structure and dynamics of 
ecosystems or the biosphere itself” (Stern, 2000: 408) As such it has been frequently 
employed in the environmental psychological literature (e.g. Hopper and Nielsen, 1991; Stern 
et al., 1999; Stern, 2000; Bamberg and Schmidt, 2003), but has also been applied in the 
economic literature (Thogersen, 1999; Brekke et al., 2010). It distinguishes norms at two 
levels: social norms are abstract and only vague guides to behavior, but are shared by all 
individuals of a group; personal norms as “expectations that people hold for themselves” 
(Schwartz, 1973), which derive from social norms, are concrete determinants of behavior, but 
are heterogeneous across individuals. They are learned in and modified through social   5
interaction. Furthermore, they are tied to a person’s self-image and are thus enforced through 
mechanisms such as guilt or pride (Schwartz, 1973). A crucial aspect of the norm-activation 
theory is that personal norms must be activated in order to affect behavior. To this end, 
individuals must firstly be aware of specific conditions that entail adverse consequences for 
others. Secondly, they must feel capable for averting these interpersonal consequences 
(Schwartz, 1973; Stern et al., 1999).
1 
Sustainability as a moral obligation to confer undiminished life opportunities to future 
generations (Solow, 1993; Anand and Sen, 2000; Howarth, 2007) is a norm that prescribes a 
form of environmentally significant behavior as this behavior affects the well-being of future 
generations through changes in the environment. Defined in such a general way, it is rather 
vague on how to act in specific situations and we consequently conceptualize it as a social 
norm in the sense of the norm-activation theory. Individuals may then be imagined to hold 
concrete expectations for themselves on how to act sustainably in specific situation. For 
example, a farmer may have expectations on how he should utilize rangeland so that future 
generations may still make a living of it. We conceptualize these expectations as personal 
norms of sustainability. 
2.2 Notion of sustainability 
We operationalize these personal norms under the notion of strong ecological-economic 
sustainability. According to this notion, relevant natural and economic stocks and services 
have to be conserved at or above specified thresholds, and have to be conserved 
independently
2 of each other (Pearce et al., 1989; Daly et al., 1994; Ekins et al., 2003). A 
given behavior, such as a farm management behavior, is sustainable if it ensures this 
conservation of stocks and services.
3  
What to conserve, i.e. which stocks and services, and how much of it, i.e. the respective 
thresholds, are normative expectations that we consider at the individuals level. Thus, we 
operationalize personal norms in the way that each individual holds separate norms for each 
                                                 
1 Individuals balance compliance with the norms with fulfilment of egoistic needs. As such they may not feel 
capable for complying with the norm (and thus not feel capable for averting adverse consequences) for ethically 
sound and less sound reasons.  
2 In this respect, strong sustainability differs from weak sustainability which only requires that the aggregate 
value of stocks and services has to be conserved (e.g. Pearce and Atkinson, 1993; Pezzey and Withagen, 1998). 
3 Strong sustainability may also be operationalized under conditions of uncertainty where the conservation of 
stocks and services is not deterministic with respect to a behaviour due to stochastic system dynamics. For 
example, (Baumgärtner and Quaas, 2009) develop an operational criterion for strong sustainability under 
uncertainty, termed ecological-economic viability. The criterion expands on the traditional notion of strong 
sustainability by also requiring that the acceptable risk has to be specified that conservation fails due to the 
stochastic system dynamics.    6
relevant stock and service in a given ecological-economic system where each norm specifies 
the threshold at which the respective stock or service should be conserved. As mentioned 
above, personal norms may be heterogeneous across the population and thus different 
individuals may ascribe different thresholds for a given stock or service. 
Finally, we note that since farmers in our case study own their farms and typically pass it on 
to their children (Olbrich et al., 2011a), we will not consider sustainability towards all 
members of the future generation in general, but rather dynastic sustainability that specifically 
is concerned with one’s own children, their children’s children and so forth. 
2.3 System description 
Commercial cattle farming in semi-arid rangelands of Namibia is a rain-fed grazing system 
(Mendelsohn, 2006; Quaas et al., 2007). The dominant biome is tree-and-scrub savannah 
(MET, 2002) which is characterized by a competition between grass and woody bush 
vegetation. Annual precipitation is on average 374 mm and the majority of rainfall occurs in a 
rainy season from November to April (Olbrich et al., 2011c). On the rangeland, grass grows 
during the rainy season and serves as the main feed for cattle. Cattle have to feed continuously 
and thus grass production in the rainy season has to maintain cattle throughout the following 
dry season and, if a drought occurs, also during the rainy and dry season thereafter. Finally, 
cattle production provides income to farmers who may in addition receive income from 
alternative on- and off-farm sources (Olbrich et al., 2011a). 
The farmer has several management strategies at his disposal by which he can impact on the 
various system components and ultimately cattle production (Olbrich et al., 2011a). Firstly, 
farmers may manage the land by adjusting land size for scale effects of cattle production 
(“rangeland size increase”) and by adjust land distribution to achieve spatial diversification 
(“spatial diversification”). Secondly, farmers may manage cattle feed. They may respond to 
the seasonality in grass production by resting part of their rangeland in order to provide 
continuous feed for cattle (“resting rangeland”). They may also compensate for brief 
shortages in feed as well as for insufficient nutrients by providing cattle with supplementary 
feed in the form of purchased hay and licks (“additional feed”). Finally, farmers may directly 
manage the cattle herd. They may choose cattle breeds adapted to local environmental 
conditions from among a variety of breeds that differing both in ecological requirements and 
productivity (“breed adaptation”). They may also choose one of various cattle production 
systems, such as weaner (selling cattle at age 9 months) or ox (selling at age 18-24 months)   7
production, which differ in their requirements for environmental condition and profits 
(“production system adaptation”).  
A sustainability problem arises at least partly from inadequate farm management (de Klerk, 
2004) that has two main adverse ecosystem and economic consequences. In regards to the 
ecosystem consequence, inadequate managements may impacts on the natural grass-bush 
coexistence by increasing the proportion of bushes. This bush encroachment in turn entails, 
for example, a decrease in biodiversity (Griffin, 1998; Maggs et al., 1998). A proxy for bush 
encroachment is the capacity to support grazing cattle (“grazing capacity”), and the time 
series of grazing capacity demonstrates that bush encroachment is indeed a major concern in 
the cattle farming region: nowadays, the grazing capacity is on average only 0.08 Large Stock 
Units
4 per hectare (LSU/ha)
5 (Olbrich et al., 2011a) which is much lower than the historic 
value of above 0.1 LSU/ha that characterized a largely undisturbed ecosystem (de Klerk, 
2004). In regards to the economic consequences, bush encroachment results in a given farm 
being able to support only a low cattle production due to insufficient forage. This in turn 
results in farm income being too low to meet operating and living cost (Lubbe, 2007; Peltzer, 
2007; Steir, 2007). 
Based on this sustainability problem and on the aforementioned system dynamics, we 
consider ecosystem condition of the rangeland, measured as grazing capacity, as well as 
income received from cattle farming as the relevant services that have to be conserved for 
strong ecological-economic sustainability. In accordance with our description of personal 
norm of sustainability from Section 2.2. we postulate that farmers have personal ecosystem 
and income norms that specify the threshold at or above which ecosystem condition and 
income have to be conserved, respectively. Those farmers who comply with the norms then 
chose management among the aforementioned strategies in such a ways as to conserve 
ecosystem conditions and income above the thresholds specified in their personal norm. 
2.4 Dual-preferences model 
Our analytical approach integrates personal norms into a behavioral model while maintaining 
individual optimization, which is a crucial aspect for an economic analysis of the impact of 
norms on behavior (Postlewaite, 2010). Specifically, we relate personal norms to behavior 
                                                 
4 A Large Stock Unit (LSU) is a standard measure for livestock quantity in Namibia. In the case of cattle, one 
cattle equals one LSU. 
5 Typically, grazing capacity is reported as hectare per Large Stock Unit. We report the inverse here and use it 
throughout this paper as our later interpretation of results will then be more intuitive.   8
using the dual-preferences model (Brekke et al., 2003; Conlin et al., 2003; Young and Burke, 
2010), which in its original form is specified as  
2 )) ( (
2
) ( ) ( a g g y u a U    

  .        ( 1 )  
Here, utility depends on egoistic preferences u(.) over private income y as well as on self-
image which captures the deviation of an individual behavioral consequence g(.) from a norm 
g ¯. If the individual does not comply to the norm, i.e. if  (.) g g  , then he receives a penalty to 
overall utility. Egoistic preferences and self-image are traded-off against each other by the 
factor  which weights how strongly the individual wishes to comply to the norm.  
We apply this model to commercial cattle farming in Namibia and include the aforementioned 
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Self-image now capture the deviation of behavior consequences from two norms that 
pertaining to ecosystem condition and income which we realize by two separate terms. For the 
term denoting self-image in respect to ecosystem condition, we consider as a specific 
behavioral consequence g(.) the actual ecosystem condition of the rangeland which dependent 
on the farmer’s management choice a. g ¯ is then the farmer’s personal ecosystem norm, i.e. 
how high the ecosystem condition should be, and the weighting factor capture how strongly 
the farmer wishes to comply to the personal ecosystem norm. For the term denoting self-
image with respect to income, we consider as a specific behavioral consequence y(.) the 
actual income a farmer receives form cattle farming that likewise depends on the management 
choice a. y ¯ is then the farmer’s personal income norm, i.e. how high income should be, and 
the weighting factor  captures how strongly the farmer wishes to comply to the personal 
income norm. We can rewrite income as a function of cattle production f(.) sold at market 
price p minus costs c(.) that are incurred during the production process. Furthermore, cattle 
production may be viewed to depend only indirectly on a, instead having ecosystem condition 
as a direct input. Thus, f(.) becomes a function of g(a).  
Following our conceptualization of personal norms of sustainability, we allow for 
heterogeneity of both personal norms across farmers. We also capture two crucial aspects of   9
strong ecological-economic sustainability. Firstly, we realize the idea that services should be 
conserved independently by introducing both personal norms additively and separately. 
Secondly, as services should be conserved at or above thresholds we model compliance with 
the norms piecewise: farmers only receive a penalty to overall utility if actual ecosystem 
condition or actual income are below the respective personal norms, not if they are above.  
Having formulated the model, we are now interested in how a change in the norms g ¯ and y ¯ 
impacts on the management choice a. We approach this by calculating the first order 
condition of Equation (2) with respect to the choice variable and by subsequently solving for 
this variable. To this end, we need to specify the involved function. We specify a quadratic 
utility function as 
2
2
) ( y y y u    

  with  0   , 0    and  0 ) ( '     y y u    which is 
increasing and concave in y. We also specify grazing capacity as linear and increasing in 
management choice, i.e.  a g a g   ) (  with  0  g , constant returns to scale, i.e. 
a a g f a g f      ) ( )) ( (  with  0    and constant marginal costs, i.e.  a c a c   ) (  with 
0  c .
6 Furthermore, we standardize prices to unity. Profit y(a) may then be rewritten as 
a a c a c a f a y          ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (  and is increasing for all a if we assume that  c   >0 
and thus  0   . 
Considering only the case that the farmer does not already comply to the norms, i.e. that 
0 ) (   a g g and that  0 ) (   a y y , it is then straightforward to show that the optimal 
management choice a can be expressed as 
y g a        3 2 1
*           (3) 
with constants > 0 (for proof, see the Appendix A.1) 
Hence, one finds that a change in optimal management choice a* for a change in the personal 
ecosystem norm g ¯ or in the personal income norm y ¯ is zero if and only if  or , respectively, 
equal zero. Thus, a change in the norms always leads to a change in management if the farmer 
is concerned with self-image in respect to ecosystem condition or income.Conversely, even if 
                                                 
6 We tested the validity of the specifications regarding the grazing capacity function and production function in 
our data using simple OLS regressions. Regarding the grazing capacity function we cannot reject a linear 
relationship between extent of the strategy and the actual grazing capacity at the 5% significance level for three 
out of the six management strategies noted in Section 2.3 (i.e. for spatial diversification, resting rangeland and 
additional feed) and deem it likely that we might find the same for the remaining three strategies if relevant 
covariates are included in a multiple regression. In regards to the production function, we likewise cannot reject 
a linear relationship between actual grazing capacity and number of cattle at the 5% significance level. Thus, we 
deem our specifications to be realistic concerning those two functions. We could not perform a similar analysis 
for the cost function as we do not have data on production costs.    10
the farmer has distinct ecosystem and income norms a change will not affect management if 
he is not concerned with self-image, i.e. if  or  equal zero. This latter case may be 
interpreted in line with the norm-activation model: the farmer has distinct personal norms, but 
the norms are not activated. 
3. Data  
3.1 Data sources 
Description of data collection 
In August 2008, we elicited personal norms of sustainability, management strategies and 
socio-demographic characteristics of commercial cattle farmers in Namibia through a mail-in 
questionnaire. A detailed description of the survey can be found in (Olbrich et al., 2009), 
which also includes a copy of the questionnaire. 
We sent out questionnaires to all cattle farming members of the Namibia Agricultural Union 
(NAU), the main interest group of commercial farmers, and to all farmers that deliver cattle to 
MeatCo, the largest slaughterhouse in Namibia. We mailed out a first batch of questionnaires 
in the period 19
th – 21
st of August 2008, and a second batch as a follow up on the 15
th of 
September 2008. We reached 1,916 of an estimated total number of 2,500 farmers. 399 
questionnaires were returned, equaling a return rate of 20.8%. 
In addition to the quantitative data collection, we conducted qualitative interviews with 
farmers, local scientists and decision makers in the agricultural, political and financial sector 
throughout four research visits in March/April 2007, October 2007, July/August 2008 and 
February/March 2010. 
Elicitation of personal norms 
As detailed in Section 2.2, we operationalize personal norms of sustainability under the notion 
of strong ecological-economic sustainability. Prior to designing the questionnaires we 
inquired in our qualitative interviews with farmers and local agricultural scientists which 
services are critical for the sustainability of the farming system. On the basis of these 
interviews we preselected the already in Section 2.3 noted ecosystem condition of the 
rangeland and income as the two most critical services, and elicited the personal ecosystem 
norm, i.e. the minimum threshold at or above which ecosystem condition should be sustained,   11
and the personal income norm
7, i.e. the minimum threshold at or above which income should 
be sustained. We measured the ecosystem norms as grazing capacity in the unit hectare per 
Large Stock Unit and the income norm as net annual income
8 in the unit Namibian Dollar 
(N$).  
Elicitation of management strategies, ecosystem condition, income and further characteristics 
In regards to farmers’ management, we elicited self-reported extent of various on-farm 
management strategies. On the basis of our qualitative interviews we selected the six most 
relevant management strategies that pertain to on-farm management choices (c.f. Section 2.3): 
rangeland size increase, spatial diversification, resting rangeland, additional feed, breed 
adaptation and production system adaptation. For each strategy we asked farmers to self-
report the extent of the strategy on a six-item Likert-scale ranging from “not at all important” 
to “very important”. We elicited actual ecosystem condition as grazing capacity in the unit 
ha/LSU. For confidentiality reasons we elicited total net annual income only as interval data 
where farmers indicated which of the following income intervals they belong to: [N$ 0, N$ 
50.000], [N$ 50.001, N$ 150.000], [N$ 150.001, N$ 250.000], [N$ 250.001, N$ 350.000], 
[N$ 350.001, ∞[. Finally, we elicited the fraction of total income that derives from cattle 
farming. 
We also elicited a variety of socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age, experience on 
present farm (i.e. number of years operating the present farm), ethnicity (i.e. Afrikaans or 
other ethnicities)
9, education (high school graduation at most vs. some sort of apprenticeship 
or college/university education), household size, ownership structure of the farm (single 
owner or multiple owners), living off farm (as a proxy for part-time farming vs. full-time 
farming), NAU membership, area of rangeland, net area of rented land (area of land rented 
minus area of land rented out), and cattle quantity. Finally, we elicited as additional 
environmental characteristics the deviation of actual from optimal bush cover as well as the 
regional location of the farm in Namibia (Erongo, Hardap/Karas, Khomas, Kunene, Omaheke, 
Oshikoto, Otjozondjupa) to cover a variety of environmental characteristics that are not 
captured in the grazing capacity. A list of all elicited variables along with their summary 
statistics is given in Table 1.  
                                                 
7 Strictly speaking, we elicited the personal income norm in respect to income from cattle farming only and not 
in respect to total income, i.e. income from cattle farming plus income from other sources. However, we will 
refer to this income from cattle farming simply as “income” for the remainder of the paper. 
8 We define net annual income as gross revenues minus operating expenses, taxes and interest on loans. 
9 Afrikaans is the most common ethnicity. Other ethnicities are predominantly German.   12
3.2 Calibration of variables and statistical specification 
Calibration of variables 
For our subsequent analysis, we calibrate personal norm variables in such a way that higher 
values denote more demanding personal norms. For example, the personal norm that income 
should be sustained at or above N$200,000 is more demanding, in the sense that it is more 
difficult to comply with, than the personal norm that income should be sustained at or above 
N$100,000. The respective variable for the personal income norm is already correctly 
calibrated in the way it was elicited, but we have to make adjustments to the personal 
ecosystem norm. We inverse the elicited variable, i.e. we use now a variable measured in 
Large Stock Unit per hectare (LSU/ha)
  instead of hectare per Large Stock Unit. 
Correspondingly, we also invert the variable for actual ecosystem condition which is now 
likewise used in the unit LSU/ha. In regards to income data which we elicited in the form of 
interval data we convert these data to discrete data by using the interval midpoints as income. 
We then multiply this variable by the fraction of total income that derives from from cattle 
farming to acquire the income that derives from cattle farming.
10 
Statistical specification 
We generate results for Research Question 1 (characterization of personal norms) through 
descriptive statistics. We approach Question 2 (determinants of personal norms) firstly by 
analyzing whether both norms are correlated by employing a Pearson correlation. We then 
model the personal norms as being dependent on actual income, actual ecosystem condition 
and on the other socio-demographic and environmental characteristics. Thus, for each of the 
two elicited personal norms, we estimate 
i Z ji Z N       0        ( 4 )  
where Nj is one of the j = 1, 2 elicited personal norms (i.e. the personal ecosystem or income 
norm),  Z a vector of socio-demographic and environmental characteristics and i  are 
unobserved factors. Even though personal norms may impact on each other, we do not include 
the respective other norm in the equation since we then incur an endogeneity problem that we 
cannot adequately address as we cannot construct suitable instrumental variables. However, 
we perform robustness checks in which we include the respective other norm and show that 
                                                 
10 We do this so that what we measure by the actual income variable corresponds to what we measure by the 
personal income norm variables (which in the strict sense measures the income norm in respect to income from 
cattle farming).   13
its inclusion does not change our results (Appendix B.1, Equation 4a). Thus, we conclude that 
we do not incur an omitted variables bias by not including the respective other norm in 
Equation (4). 
We analyze Question 3 (impact of personal norms on management) by modeling each of the 
six management strategies as a function of the personal ecosystem and income norm while 
controlling for socio-demographic and environmental characteristics. For each strategy we 
estimate the equation 
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where Sk is the self-reported extent of management strategy k = 1, …, 6, g ¯ the personal 
ecosystem norm, g the actual ecosystem condition, y ¯ the personal income norm, y the actual 
income,  X a vector of socio-demographic and environmental characteristics and i are 
unobserved factors. Similar to Equation (4), the different management strategies may impact 
on each other but we do not include the respective other strategies in Equation (5) since we 
then incur an endogeneity problem that we likewise cannot adequately address as we cannot 
construct suitable instrumental variables. However, we perform robustness checks in which 
we include the respective other strategies and show that their inclusion does not change our 
results (Appendix B.2, Equation 5a). Thus, we conclude that we do not incur an omitted 
variables bias by not including the respective other strategies in Equation (5). 
With the term G[.] and Y[.] we achieve a piecewise regression over the personal ecosystem 
norm g ¯ and income norm y ¯, respectively, which is a reduced form of the standard piecewise 
regression function (for proof, see Appendix A.2). For farmers who do not comply with the 
ecosystem (income) norm, i.e. for whom the actual ecosystem condition (income) is lower the 
ecosystem (income) norm, G[.] (Y[.]) is positive. Conversely, for farmers who comply with 
the ecosystem (income) norm, i.e. for whom actual ecosystem condition (income) is at least as 
high as the ecosystem (income) norm, G[.] (Y[.]) is zero. This corresponds to properties of the 
behavioral model of Equation (2) that states that personal norms only impact on utility if the 
actual values are below the respective norms. Finally, rescaling g ¯ and y ¯ by subtracting the 
actual values g and y ensures that the pieces are joined together at the respective breakpoints.    14
We are especially interested in the coefficients g ¯ and y ¯  that describes the effect of a change 
in the ecosystem and income norms on the extent of management for a given strategy 
(conditional on the actual ecosystem condition and income being lower than the respective 
norms). In order to interpret these coefficients we draw on the result for optimal management 
a
* that we have developed in Equation (3). Specifically, we see that non-zero values for these 
coefficients imply that the weighting factors and  are non-zero, i.e. that self-image with 
respect to ecosystem condition and income indeed impact on utility. Conversely, if the 
coefficients are zero, this implies that and  equal zero, i.e. that self-image does not play a 
role in utility maximization. In the latter case, farmers may have distinct personal norms, but 
they do not factor into their choices regarding management. 
Robustness checks 
We have already mentioned two robustness checks above that we perform for Equation (4) 
and (5). In addition, we perform various other checks for Equation (5) since this equation is 
used to produce our most relevant results. These checks involve different definition of 
income, the application of different regression models and expansion of Equation (5) that 
include the effect of social interactions on compliance with personal norms. These robustness 
checks are explained in detail in Appendix B.2. 
4. Results 
4.1 Characterization of personal norms 
For the norm pertaining to sustainable ecosystem condition of the rangeland, we find that 
grazing condition should on average be at or above 0.08 LSU/ha with a standard deviation of 
0.03 LSU/ha (Figure 1a, Table 1). For the personal norm pertaining to sustainable income, 
farmers indicated on average that annual net income should be at or above N$275,107 with a 
standard deviation of N$206,991 (Figure 1b, Table 1). 
Thus, we find personal norms of sustainability that are heterogeneous across individuals with 
both norms unimodally distributed and clustered around intermediate values. This 
heterogeneity of personal norms can be explained by the norm-activation theory, which 
predicts that individuals differ in the concrete specification of personal norms. Indeed, such 
heterogeneity has been demonstrated for a variety of personal norms such as those pertaining 
to littering (Kallgren et al., 2000), recycling (Hopper and Nielsen, 1991; Thogersen, 1999) 
and environmentally friendly transportation (Widegren, 1998; Bamberg and Schmidt, 2003).   15
4.2 Determinants of personal norms 
When examining determinants of personal norms we firstly find that both personal norms are 
not correlated with each other as indicated by a Pearson’s correlation (r=0.03, p=0.59). Thus, 
farmers seem to attain these norms independently from each other. Only few previous studies 
have analyzed the interrelation between personal norms, but found that different norms are 
positively correlated (Widegren, 1998; Thogersen, 1999). Thørgersen (1999) examined the 
underlying reason for this correlation and hypothesized that the “correlation may indeed be 
caused by them [i.e. personal norms] having shared [mental] antecedents” (Thogersen, 1999: 
67). Such antecedents may be a person’s values, which Thørgersen (1999) could indeed 
demonstrate, but a person’s values explained only a small share of variability in personal 
norms. This suggests that the determination of norms through mental antecedents is much 
more complex. In the light of this we find it not unsurprising that the specific norms we 
elicited are not correlated. However, our survey was not design to examine in depth the 
relationship between different norms and their antecedents, and we thus may not hypothesize 
on the reasons of norms being uncorrelated.  
We find little evidence of socio-demographic and environmental characteristics impacting on 
personal norms (Table 2). Both ecosystem and income norm are significantly positively 
related to actual ecosystem condition and actual income, respectively: for each unit increase 
in actual ecosystem condition the ecosystem norm increases by 0.60 LSU/ha, and for each 
unit increase in actual income the income norm increases by 0.69 N$. This positive 
relationship conforms to predictions of the behavioral model of Equation (2), where an 
increase in ecosystem condition (income) leads to an increase in the ecosystem (income) norm 
and vice versa.
11  
Area of rangeland is significantly related to both norms but in opposite direction: each hectare 
of rangeland is associated with a decrease in the ecosystem norm by 1.4e-06 LSU/ha and an 
increase in the income norm by N$ 6.8. If we interpret area of rangeland as a proxy of wealth 
then these findings indicate that more wealthy farmers have lower ecosystem norms but 
higher income norms. Farm experience is significantly negatively related to both norms. For 
each additional year of experience, the ecosystem norm decreases by 8.3e-04 and the income 
norm by N$ 3,400. We find no other socio-demographic or environmental characteristic that 
is related with both norms. The remaining characteristics are at most related to only one norm 
                                                 
11 Calculating the first order condition of Equation (2) (c.f. in Appendix A.1) and solving for g ¯  and  y ¯, 
respectively, yields this prediction.   16
with the majority of characteristics not being related to either norm. Thus, by and large, we do 
not find that personal norms of sustainability vary systematically across subpopulations. 
4.3 Impact of personal norms on management 
We find no significant interaction even at the 10% significance level between the personal 
norms and self-reported management for any of the six analyzed strategies, regardless of 
whether covariates are excluded (Table 3) or included (Table 4). Thus, we find no evidence 
that the factors weighting self-image versus egoistic preferences in the dual-preferences 
model are non-zero. This means that there is no evidence that personal norms impact on 
actual behavior. These results agree with previous findings that even distinct norms may have 
little or no impact on behavior, as for example demonstrated for helping behavior (Schwartz, 
1977) or car use (Bamberg and Schmidt, 2003). 
Socio-demographic and environmental characteristics have only a sporadic effect on 
management with only two strategies, spatial diversification and additional feed, showing any 
significant relation with more than three characteristics. Reversely, only one characteristic, 
rented rangeland area, is related to more than two strategies, i.e. rangeland size increase, 
spatial diversification and production system adaptation. As one would expect, we find that 
rangeland size increase is positively related to rented rangeland area, where each ha increases 
the extent of this management strategy by 7.5e-05, and that spatial diversification is related to 
both rangeland area and rented rangeland area, where each ha increases the extent by 7.2e-05 
and 9.7e-05, respectively. Beyond this observation we cannot discern any other expected 
relationship. We conclude that choice of management does by and large not systematically 
vary across subpopulation.  
4.4 Robustness checks 
To test the sensitivity of our results, we perform a variety of robustness checks which are 
detailed in Appendix B.1 and B.2. 
Robustness check for analysis of Research Question 2 (determinants of personal norms) 
We examine whether estimation results for the coefficients of determinants of a given 
personal norm are sensitive to the inclusion of the respective other norm (which we 
previously excluded to avoid a potential endogeneity problem). Results for this check show 
that almost all coefficients previously significant (insignificant) remain significant 
(insignificant) in the robustness check. Furthermore, all coefficients that are significant in the   17
original equation retain sign and order of magnitude in the robustness check, and vice versa. 
We thus conclude that we can exclude the respective other norms without incurring an 
omitted variable bias for almost any variable. 
Robustness check for analysis of Research Question 3 (impact of personal norms on 
management) 
We perform several checks for this Research Question. In the first check we examine whether 
estimation results for the coefficients of personal norms on a given management strategy are 
sensitive to the inclusion of the respective other management strategies (which we previously 
excluded to avoid a potential endogeneity problem). Results show that coefficients are 
unchanged and we conclude that we can exclude the respective other management strategies 
without incurring an omitted variable bias in respect to the personal norm coefficients. 
A series of three checks involve alternative specifications of the income variables as 
logarithmic income – where we simultaneously also use the logarithm of the personal income 
norm –, and as the lower and upper bound of the income interval elicited in the questionnaire 
(whereas we previously used the mid-points of the intervals). Estimating results confirm our 
previous results in that we do not find evidence that personal norms impact on management. 
In three further checks we employ alternative regression models, namely ordered probit and 
ordered logit models as well as a Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression system where we 
estimate all six management strategies jointly. Again, estimate results confirm our previous 
results in that we do not find evidence that personal norms impact on management. 
Finally, in two checks we test whether other farmers’ management and personal norms, 
respectively, impact on compliance with personal norms. We assume that farmer know about 
management and norms of other farmers in their region through exchange with these farmers 
on a variety of regional platforms provided by the NAU. Thus, for those farmers who are 
members of the NAU and operate full-time (many part-time farmers do not live in their farms’ 
region and can attend these platforms only rarely), we calculate regional averages of the 
extent of management and of the level of personal norms, respectively. In one check, we then 
interact individual farmers’ personal norms with the regional averages of the management 
strategy that is currently estimated. In the other check, we interact the individual farmers’ 
personal norms with the respective regional averages of the personal norms. We find no 
evidence that either the management or personal norms of other farmers influences 
compliance with the personal norms.     18
5. Discussion and conclusion 
For the empirical case study of commercial cattle farming in semi-arid rangelands of 
Namibia, where farmers as the main economic actors are closely linked to the environment, 
we have conceptualized personal norms of sustainability according to the norm-activation 
theory, operationalized them under the notion of strong ecological-economic sustainability 
and analyzed them with an adapted dual-preferences model. We find that 1) individual 
farmers have personal norms of sustainability that are heterogeneous across individuals, 2) 
these norms are uncorrelated with each other and vary only little with socio-demographic and 
environmental characteristics, and 3) there is no evidence that these norms have an impact on 
actual management. 
The last conclusion is of particular relevance, as it may explain the observed degradation of 
rangelands in Namibia. Some discussion is needed, however. Firstly, it is theoretically 
impossible to demonstrate that an impact of norms on management does not exist: we cannot 
accept the null hypothesis but only fail to reject it. In reality, norms may impact on 
management but a sample bias or an inappropriate choice of econometric methods might 
preclude the detection of this impact. We have no indication that our sample might be biased 
in those characteristics that are crucial for this study (Olbrich et al., 2009),
12 and rerunning 
our analysis with common alternative regression models as well as with alternative 
specifications of variables and equations demonstrated that results are robust. Thus, even 
though we may not make a definite statement, we consider it at least highly probable that 
norms do not impact on management. Secondly, we cannot estimate management strategies 
jointly in a simultaneous equation model, even though strategies are significantly interrelated, 
as we cannot construct suitable instrumental variables. Instead, we estimate each management 
strategy separately without including the respective other management strategies. Robustness 
checks show that we do not incur an unobserved variable bias for the coefficients of primary 
interest, i.e. the personal norm coefficient, and we thus conclude that this approach is 
justified. Thirdly, we formulate the behavioral model under certainty and may thus only 
consider deterministic sustainability. Given that semi-arid rangelands a subject to a variety of 
risks (Olbrich et al., 2011c), a more realistic approach would be the use of a model that 
describes behavior under uncertainty where we then would consider sustainability under 
                                                 
12 No database exists that contains all commercial cattle farmers and their key socio-demographic characteristics. 
We thus compared samples from two subpopulations, NAU members and MeatCo customers, but found no 
difference in important socio-demographic characteristics (Olbrich et al., 2009). We add here that samples also 
do not differ in personal norms and on-farm management strategies (t-tests, p>0.1 for all personal norms and 
strategies).    19
uncertainty. However, we cannot estimate such a model as we could not elicit all the required 
information with our cross-sectional survey, specifically the individual, on-farm distributions 
of ecosystem condition and income.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe that our analysis provides novel insights into 
why farmers’ management behavior may contribute to the pervasive degradation in Namibia: 
farmers have personal norms but they do not impact on behavior, presumably because they 
are not activated. This in turn suggest that activation may promote behavioral changes that 
may entail sustainability of cattle farming, which is similar to suggestions voiced in the 
environmental psychology literature for promoting pro-environmental behavior (Stern, 2000). 
To this end, one first has to clarify why norms are not activated. From our qualitative 
interviews we have anecdotic evidence that farmers are aware that inadequate management 
degrades the environment and thus has adverse consequences to future generations (Joubert, 
2008; Neumann, 2008). Moreover, farmers may feel incapable of averting adverse 
consequences of their management as they rather pursue short-term profit (Pack, 2008). Thus, 
we hypothesize that norms are not activated because farmer feel not capable of averting 
adverse consequences of their behavior. A next question then is why this might be the case. 
This information is required to decide whether taking measures for norm activation is justified 
(farmers may have ethically sound reasons for not feeling capable) and exactly what measures 
to take. Clearly, this requires more study, and we consider it worthwhile. Further investigating 
norms of sustainability and their activation is a promising approach to promote sustainability 
of livestock farming in semi-arid rangelands. 
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Figure 1: a) Personal ecosystem norm, measured in Large Stock Units per hectare [LSU/ha], 
N=380. b) Personal income norm, measured in 1,000 Namibian Dollar [N$1,000], N=353.    25
Table 1: Summary statistics. Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for all those farmers who do 
not display missing values for any variable used in the estimation of management strategies (c.f. Equation 5, 
Table 4). N=260. 
Variable Definition  Mean Std.  dev.  Min  Max
Personal norms      
Ecosystem  norm  Minimum threshold at or above which 
grazing capacity should be sustained, in 
Large Stock Unit per hectare 
0.08 0.03 0.01  0.33
Income  norm  Minimum threshold at or above which 
annual net income from cattle farming 
should be sustained, in N$ 
275,107 206,991 4,000  2,000,000
Socio-demographic characteristics 
  
Income  Net annual income from cattle farming; 
calculated as mid-points of six intervals of 
total annual income, corrected for fraction 
derived from cattle farming, in N$ 
114,019 96,820 0  360,000
Female Female  0.03 0.16  0.0  1.0
Age  Age in years  54.0 11.6  27.0  90.0
Farm experience  Experience in farming in years  24.6 12.8  1.5  70.0
Afrikaans Afrikaans  0.5 0.5  0.0  1.0
Low education  No college or apprenticeship education  0.2 0.4  0.0  1.0
Household size  Number of household members  3.3 1.6  0.0  8.0
Single ownership  Farm operated under single owner  0.7 0.5  0.0  1.0
Living off farm  Farmer lives off farm during week, proxy 
for part-time farming 
0.2 0.4 0.0  1.0
NAU  member  Member of the Namibia Agricultural 
Union 
0.83 0.37 0.0  1.0
Rangeland area  Area of rangeland in hectares  8,212 5,460  0  44,244
Rented  rangeland  area  Area of net rented (i.e. rented minus 
rented out) rangeland in hectares 
1,314 2,905 -5,000  13,000




   cover deviation 
Deviation of actual from optimal bush 
cover on farm, in percent 
-15.8 20.8 -80.0  30.0
Ecosystem  condition  Ecosystem condition measured as Large 
Stock Unit per hectare 
0.08 0.03 0.02  0.33
Erongo  Farm located in Erongo  0.06 0.23  0.00  1.00
Hardap/Karas  Farm located in Hardap or Karas  0.04 0.20  0.00  1.00
Khomas  Farm located in Khomas  0.20 0.40  0.00  1.00  26
Variable Definition  Mean Std.  dev.  Min  Max
Kunene  Farm located in Kunene  0.09 0.29  0.00  1.00
Omaheke  Farm located in Omaheke  0.23 0.42  0.00  1.00
Oshikoto  Farm located in Oshikoto  0.02 0.14  0.00  1.00
Otjiozondjupa  Farm located in Otjiozondjupa  0.36 0.48  0.00  1.00
Management strategies                
[1=not at all important, 6=very important] 
  
Rangeland size increase  Purchase/lease of extra rangeland for scale 
effects 
3.3 1.6 1.0  6.0
Spatial diversification  Purchase/lease of extra rangeland in areas 
with different rainfall patterns 
3.2 1.7 1.0  6.0
Resting  rangeland  Resting part of rangeland in good rainy 
seasons as buffer for bad seasons 
4.6 1.6 1.0  6.0
Additional feed  Purchase of supplementary feed  4.6 1.6  1.0  6.0
Breed  adaptation  Choice of breed adapted to high 
variability in grass production 
4.5 1.5 1.0  6.0
Production system 
adaptation 
Choice of cattle production system  4.4 1.4  1.0  6.0
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Table 2: Determinants of personal norms of sustainability. OLS regression, coefficients with standard errors in 
brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Dependent variables:  Ecosystem 
norm 
Income norm
Income –2.4e–09  6.9e–01***
 (2.36e–08)  (1.33e–01) 
Female –1.5e–02  1.0e+04 
 (1.13e–02)  (6.95e+04) 
Age 8.1e–04***  1.2e+03 
 (2.51e–04)  (1.40e+03) 
Farm experience  –8.3e–04***  –3.4e+03***
 (2.20e–04)  (1.23e+03) 
Afrikaans –2.2e–03  2.2e+04 
 (4.40e–03)  (2.43e+04) 
Low education  8.3e–03  1.5e+04 
 (5.20e–03)  (2.88e+04) 
Household size  2.6e–03*  –4.3e+03 
 (1.36e–03)  (7.52e+03) 
Single ownership  2.1e–03  –4.6e+03 
 (4.56e–03)  (2.56e+04) 
Living off farm  –3.4e–03  –2.2e+03 
 (5.31e–03)  (2.96e+04) 
NAU member  3.2e–03  2.0e+04 
 (5.67e–03)  (3.18e+04) 
Rangeland area  –1.4e–06**  6.8e+00* 
 (6.34e–07)  (3.49e+00) 
Rented rangeland area  7.7e–08  –4.0e+00 
 (7.83e–07)  (4.33e+00) 
Cattle quantity  1.3e–05  –6.6e+00 
 (8.92e–06)  (4.89e+01) 
–9.7e–05 –4.7e+02  Optimal–actual bush  
  cover deviation  (1.11e–04)  (6.09e+02) 
Ecosystem condition  6.0e–01***  9.1e+04 
 (7.14e–02)  (3.97e+05) 
Erongo –2.3e–02**  1.8e+04 
 (9.51e–03)  (5.36e+04) 
Hardap/Karas –1.8e–02  1.8e+05***
 (1.21e–02)  (6.62e+04) 
Khomas –9.9e–03*  4.5e+03 
 (5.74e–03)  (3.23e+04) 
Kunene –5.3e–03  –4.7e+04 
 (7.58e–03)  (4.22e+04) 
Omaheke –4.4e–03  1.0e+04 
 (5.63e–03)  (3.09e+04) 
Oshikoto –1.3e–02  –7.8e+04 
 (1.61e–02)  (8.80e+04) 
Constant 6.9e–03  1.3e+05 
 (1.66e–02)  (9.06e+04) 
Adjusted R
2 0.303  0.165 
F–statistic 7.120  3.679 
Model significance  0.000  0.000 
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Table 3: Impact of personal norms on management, without covariates. OLS regressions, coefficients with 
standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 













Ecosystem  norm –5.180 1.196  2.048 2.084 2.511 1.729 
  (4.848) (4.808)  (2.926) (2.906) (2.578) (2.660) 
Income  norm  7.8e–07 1.2e–07 –3.0e–08 3.8e–07 7.5e–08 4.2e–07 
  (5.2e–07) (5.2e–07)  (4.8e–07) (4.7e–07) (4.2e–07) (4.3e–07) 
Constant  3.220*** 3.181***  4.601*** 4.557*** 4.491*** 4.346*** 
  (0.137) (0.137)  (0.121) (0.120) (0.106) (0.109) 
Adjusted R
2  0.004 –0.006  –0.005 –0.002 –0.003 –0.002 
F–statistic  1.612 0.063  0.245 0.615 0.502 0.717 
Model  significance  0.201 0.939  0.783 0.541 0.606 0.489 
Observations  299 318  326 327 325 326 
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Table 4: Impact of personal norms on management, with covariates. OLS regressions, coefficients with standard 
errors in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 













Ecosystem  norm –1.943 5.884  3.540  –0.036 2.714 4.018 
  (5.731) (5.642)  (3.153) (3.081) (2.865) (2.915) 
Income  norm  4.7e–07  –5.1e–08  3.9e–07 2.6e–08 1.6e–07 4.2e–07 
  (5.8e–07) (5.8e–07)  (5.2e–07) (5.1e–07) (4.7e–07) (4.8e–07) 
Female 0.192  –0.031  1.135**  0.379  1.104**  0.436 
  (0.645) (0.625)  (0.562) (0.549) (0.511) (0.519) 
Age  –0.006 0.001 –0.001 0.012 0.014 0.009 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Farm experience  –0.016  –0.006  0.013  –0.019*  –0.008  0.006 
  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Afrikaans  0.367 0.077  0.486**  0.141 0.011 0.174 
  (0.224) (0.221)  (0.197) (0.193) (0.179) (0.182) 
Low  education  0.109 0.222  0.111 0.344 0.077  –0.133 
  (0.278) (0.268)  (0.237) (0.231) (0.216) (0.219) 
Household  size  0.042 0.035  0.046 0.036 0.076  –0.008 
  (0.068) (0.069)  (0.061) (0.060) (0.056) (0.057) 
Single  ownership  –0.090  0.092  0.332 –0.053 –0.086 –0.284 
  (0.232) (0.231)  (0.207) (0.202) (0.188) (0.191) 
Living off farm  0.190  0.480*  0.322  0.475**  0.138  –0.069 
  (0.266) (0.269)  (0.239) (0.233) (0.217) (0.220) 
NAU  member  –0.135 –0.293  –0.128  0.218 –0.115  0.241 
  (0.285) (0.285)  (0.256) (0.250) (0.233) (0.237) 
Rangeland  area  6.5e–06 7.2e–05**  4.0e–05 1.3e–05 2.2e–05 7.5e–05***
  (3.0e–05) (3.1e–05)  (2.8e–05) (2.7e–05) (2.5e–05) (2.5e–05) 
Rented  rangeland  area 7.5e–05* 9.7e–05**  –4.5e–05 –3.0e–05 –8.7e–06 –5.5e–05* 
  (3.9e–05) (3.9e–05)  (3.5e–05) (3.5e–05) (3.2e–05) (3.3e–05) 
Cattle  quantity  1.9e–04 –1.0e–03**  –8.9e–04**  1.6e–04 –1.6e–05 –4.9e–04 
  (4.1e–04) (4.2e–04)  (3.8e–04) (3.7e–04) (3.4e–04) (3.5e–04) 
–0.004 –0.003  0.001  0.002 –0.003 –0.003  Optimal–actual bush  
  cover deviation  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Erongo 0.387  –0.502  0.189  –1.430***  0.280  0.324 
  (0.473) (0.485)  (0.435) (0.425) (0.404) (0.401) 
Hardap/Karas –0.784  –0.592  –0.751 –0.482 –0.770 –0.649 
  (0.590) (0.606)  (0.544) (0.532) (0.494) (0.503) 
Khomas –0.029  –0.010  0.023  –0.291  0.011  0.232 
  (0.300) (0.300)  (0.265) (0.259) (0.240) (0.246) 
Kunene  0.170 0.414 –0.029  –0.336 0.328 0.403 
  (0.383) (0.377)  (0.338) (0.330) (0.306) (0.312) 
Omaheke –0.347  –0.261  –0.154  0.652***  0.094  –0.056 
  (0.284) (0.283)  (0.251) (0.245) (0.228) (0.232) 
Oshikoto –0.642  –0.838  0.530  0.419  0.113  0.409 
  (0.761) (0.786)  (0.706) (0.690) (0.641) (0.652) 
Constant  3.525*** 2.986***  3.807*** 3.836*** 3.483*** 3.209*** 
  (0.752) (0.761)  (0.675) (0.660) (0.614) (0.625) 
Adjusted R
2 0.027  0.028  0.039  0.090  –0.006  0.023 
F–statistic  1.346 1.385  1.553 2.333 0.918 1.317 
Model  significance  0.147 0.125  0.061 0.001 0.568 0.163 
Observations  261 278  284 284 283 283 
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Appendix A:  Proofs 
A.1 Calculation of first order condition 
Assume  0 ) (   a g g and that  0 ) (   a y y . Then, differentiating Equation (2) with respect to 
a and specifying the involved functions as detailed in Section 2.4 yields the first order 
condition: 
0 ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( ' )) ( ( ) ( ' )) ( ( ) ( ' )) ( ( '
) (
             
         
       
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a y a y y a g a g g a y a y u
da
a dU
     (2a) 
Rearranging the equation yields 
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The change in optimal management is thus characterized by the following result: 
Proposition 1:   A change in optimal management choice a* for a change in the norm g ¯ is zero 
if and only if  equals zero. 
Proposition 2: A change in optimal management choice a* for a change in the norm y ¯ is zero 
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A.2 Reduced form of the piecewise regression 
The full form for the piecewise regression of Equation (5) is 
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Rescaling the norms g ¯ and y ¯ by subtracting the actual values g and y ensures that the pieces 
are joined together at the respective breakpoints. 
The behavioral model in Equation (2) states that personal norms do not influence utility if 
farmers comply with the norms, i.e. if actual values exceed the respective norms. For the 
regression equation this implies that the coefficients g ¯c and y ¯c are zero for the terms Gc[.] 
and Yc[.], respectively, which describe the pieces where norms are complied with.  
Thus,equation (5a) can be reduced to  
i i x i y i g ki X y Y g G S           ] [ ] [ 0      (5) 
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Appendix B:  Robustness checks 
We perform several robustness checks for Research Question 2 (determinants of personal 
norms) and Research Question 3 (impact of personal norms on management). If indicated, we 
have provided estimation results of the checks in tables at the end of this appendix. Tables 
with estimation results for the other checks are available upon request. 
B.1 Robustness check for analysis of Research Question 2 (determinants of personal 
norms) 
Other personal norm as covariate 
As previously noted, Nj, that is one of the j = 1, 2 elicited personal norms, may also depend on 
the respective other norm, but including the other norm may create an endogeneity problem. 
We cannot adequately address this problem in a simultaneous equation model as we do not 
have suitable instrument variables. Instead, we here augment Equation (4) by also including 
the other norm as a covariate and estimate  
i Z i ON ji Z ON N         0      ( 4 a )  
where ONi the respective other elicited norm and i is the error term. All other variables are 
defined as in Equation (4). Results show that almost all coefficients significant (insignificant) 
in Equation (4) remain significant (insignificant) in Equation (4a) (Table 5). The exception 
are the dummy variables for farm location in the region Khomas, which is no longer 
significant in the robustness check, and for farm location in Hardap/Karas, which is 
significant in the robustness check. Furthermore, all coefficients that are significant in 
Equation (4) retain sign and order of magnitude in Equation (4a), and vice versa. We thus 
conclude that we can exclude the respective other norms without incurring an omitted variable 
bias for almost any variable. 
B.2 Robustness checks for analysis of Research Question 3 (impact of personal norms on 
management) 
Other management strategies as covariate 
We expect that Sk, i.e. the self-reported extent of management strategy k = 1, …, 6, also 
depends on the extent of the respective five other management strategies, but, similar to 
above, we cannot adequately address the ensuing endogeneity problem. Instead, we here 
augment Equation (5) by including the respective five other strategies as covariates and 
estimate 
i i x i OS i y i g ki X OS y Y g G S             ] [ ] [ 0      (5a)   33
where OSi a vector of the respective five other management strategies and i is the error term. 
All other variables are defined as in Equation (5). Estimation results of Equation (5a) show 
that the coefficients of personal norms remain insignificant (Table 6). We thus conclude that 
we do not incur an omitted variable bias for the coefficient of primary interest, i.e. the 
personal norm coefficients, by excluding these other strategies. 
Alternative income definitions 
We perform three robustness checks in which we employ alternative specification of the 
income variable to estimate Equation (5). In the first, we substitute both the personal income 
norm and actual income by their respective logarithms. In the second and third check we 
address the fact that we did not elicit the precise level for actual income but rather income 
intervals. Previously, we use interval mid-points as an approximation to precise actual 
income. We now instead use the lower bound of the income interval in the second robustness 
check, and the upper bound of the income interval in the third check. Estimate results for all 
checks confirm our previous results in that we do not find evidence that personal norms 
impact on management.  
Alternative regression models 
We perform three robustness checks in which we employ alternative regression models to 
estimate Equation (5). In the first two checks, we defined Sk, the self-reported extent of 
management strategy k = 1, …, 6, as an ordinal variable whereas we previously had defined it 
as a continuous variable. We then estimate Equation (5) as an ordered probit model (first 
check) and as an ordered logit model (second check). For the third check, we estimate the 
previously separate equations for the six management strategies jointly in a seemingly 
unrelated regression system (Zellner, 1962). We thereby allow for correlation of the error 
terms across equations, essentially assuming that unspecified factors impact equally on all six 
strategies. Again, estimate results for all checks confirm our previous results in that we do not 
find evidence that personal norms impact on management.  
Influence of other farmers’ personal norms and management 
Previously, we assumed that compliance with the personal norms is independent of what other 
farmers are doing. Here, we conduct two robustness checks of this assumption for Equation 
(5) which we expand by additionally allowing for social interactions to influence compliance. 
Ideally we would require information on exactly what other farmers a given farmer interacts, 
but we do not have this information. Instead, we make use of various other information: 
firstly, the NAU provides a variety of platforms for meetings and knowledge exchange 
between their members; secondly, NAU members within a region are more likely to interact   34
than NAU members between regions as the NAU provides many of its platforms at the major 
regional cities; and thirdly, only full-time farmers regularly interact on these platforms since 
part-time farmers typically do not have the time to attend these platforms (many part-time 
farmers do not live in their farms’ region and can attend these platforms only rarely). Thus, 
we focus on farmer who are NAU members and live on farm, and group farmers by regions.  
We firstly examine whether other farmers’ management influence compliance with personal 
norms. To this end, we assume that farmers discuss their farm management at the NAU 
platforms and that based on these discussions each farmer can deduce the average level of 
extent for each strategy in his region. Thus, we calculate regional averages for the extent of 
each management strategy and interact them with farmers’ individual ecosystem and income 
norms, respectively, estimating the equation 
i i x
R
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   (5b) 
where 
R
ki S  is the regional averaged extent of management Strategy k, 
R
ki i S g G  ] [  and 
R
ki i S y Y  ] [  are interaction effects between the regional averaged extent of this strategy and the 
ecosystem norm and income norm, respectively, and  i   is the error term. All other variables 
are defined as in Equation (5). We run two specifications, one without Xi (for which we 
provide no table) and one with Xi (Table 7). Estimation results confirm our previous findings 
as neither the main effect of the personal norms nor their interaction effects impact on 
management. Thus, we find no evidence that other farmers’ management, as averaged per 
region, influences compliance with the norms. 
Secondly, we examine whether other farmers’ personal norms influence compliance with 
personal norms. Again, we assume that farmers know the regional averaged level for each 
personal norm based on exchange at NAU platforms. We calculate regional averages for the 
personal ecosystem and income norm and interact them with farmers’ individual ecosystem 
and income norms, respectively, estimating the equation 
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R
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   (5c) 
where 
R
i g and 
R
i y  are regional averaged levels for the personal ecosystem and income norm, 
respectively, 
R
i i g g G  ] [ and 
R
i i y y Y  ] [  are interaction effects between an individual farmer’s 
ecosystem norm and the regional averaged ecosystem norm, and between and individual   35
farmers’ income norm and the regional averaged income norm, respectively. i is the error 
term. All other variables are defined as in Equation (5). We run two specifications, one 
without Xi (for which we provide no table) and one with Xi (Table 8). Again, we find that 
neither the main effect of personal norms nor their interaction effects are significant in either 
the model with or without covariates. Thus, we find no evidence that other farmers’ personal 
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Table 5: Determinants of personal norms of sustainability with the respective other personal norm included. 
OLS regressions, coefficients with standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
Dependent variables:  Ecosystem 
norm 
Income norm
Ecosystem norm    3.3e+05 
   (3.33e+05) 
Income norm  1.1e–08   
 (1.15e–08)   
Income –1.2e–08  6.9e–01***
 (2.61e–08)  (1.34e–01) 
Female –1.0e–02  1.3e+04 
 (1.29e–02)  (6.97e+04) 
Age 8.6e–04***  1.0e+03 
 (2.62e–04)  (1.44e+03) 
Farm experience  –8.6e–04***  –3.2e+03** 
 (2.34e–04)  (1.28e+03) 
Afrikaans –2.1e–03  2.3e+04 
 (4.53e–03)  (2.44e+04) 
Low education  8.7e–03  1.6e+04 
 (5.41e–03)  (2.93e+04) 
Household size  2.8e–03**  –5.6e+03 
 (1.40e–03)  (7.61e+03) 
Single ownership  2.0e–03  –4.0e+03 
 (4.77e–03)  (2.57e+04) 
Living off farm  –3.6e–03  –2.3e+03 
 (5.51e–03)  (2.97e+04) 
NAU member  1.9e–03  1.9e+04 
 (5.91e–03)  (3.18e+04) 
Rangeland area  –1.5e–06**  7.3e+00** 
 (6.54e–07)  (3.53e+00) 
Rented rangeland area  1.4e–07  –3.9e+00 
 (8.18e–07)  (4.40e+00) 
Cattle quantity  1.3e–05  –1.1e+01 
 (9.10e–06)  (4.92e+01) 
–1.1e–04 –5.2e+02  Optimal–actual bush  
  cover deviation  (1.16e–04)  (6.26e+02) 
Ecosystem condition  6.0e–01***  –9.5e+04 
 (7.38e–02)  (4.45e+05) 
Erongo –2.4e–02**  2.7e+04 
 (9.97e–03)  (5.43e+04) 
Hardap/Karas –2.1e–02*  1.9e+05***
 (1.25e–02)  (6.68e+04) 
Khomas –7.7e–03  9.4e+03 
 (6.11e–03)  (3.30e+04) 
Kunene –5.0e–03  –4.4e+04 
 (7.87e–03)  (4.23e+04) 
Omaheke –4.8e–03  1.5e+04 
 (5.78e–03)  (3.12e+04) 
Oshikoto –1.3e–02  –7.3e+04 
 (1.64e–02)  (8.83e+04) 
Constant 4.7e–03  1.3e+05 
 (1.70e–02)  (9.13e+04) 
Adjusted R
2 0.300  0.167 
F–statistic 6.525  3.571 
Model significance  0.000  0.000 
Observations 284  284   37
Table 6: Impact of personal norms on management with respective other management strategies included. OLS 
regressions, coefficients with standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 













Ecosystem norm  –5.064  5.602  0.712  –0.672  1.664  1.359 
  (4.527) (4.545)  (5.366) (5.180) (4.620) (4.691) 
Income norm  5.9e–07  –5.1e–07  1.4e–07  9.1e–08  –3.3e–09  4.0e–07 
  (4.6e–07) (4.6e–07)  (5.4e–07) (5.2e–07) (4.7e–07) (4.7e–07) 
Female 0.075  –0.223  0.865  0.104  0.919*  –0.006 
  (0.516) (0.519)  (0.608) (0.589) (0.522) (0.534) 
Age –0.003  –0.003  –0.001  0.008  0.005  0.003 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Farm experience  –0.012  0.003  0.015  –0.011  –0.005  0.013 
  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Afrikaans 0.213  –0.097  0.538**  0.110  –0.009  0.163 
  (0.180) (0.182)  (0.211) (0.206) (0.184) (0.187) 
Low  education  0.008 0.138  0.020 0.215  –0.070  –0.248 
  (0.222) (0.223)  (0.263) (0.253) (0.226) (0.229) 
Household  size  0.020 0.007 –0.002 0.026 0.082  –0.054 
  (0.054) (0.054)  (0.064) (0.062) (0.055) (0.056) 
Single ownership  –0.166  0.214  0.363*  –0.052  –0.071  –0.240 
  (0.185) (0.186)  (0.218) (0.211) (0.189) (0.191) 
Living  off  farm  –0.113 0.232  0.335 0.342 0.058  –0.026 
  (0.213) (0.214)  (0.251) (0.242) (0.217) (0.220) 
NAU member  0.026  –0.245  –0.009  0.236  –0.185  0.377 
  (0.227) (0.228)  (0.268) (0.259) (0.231) (0.233) 
Rangeland area  –3.5e–05  5.0e–05**  3.9e–05  –7.3e–06  –9.6e–06  6.5e–05** 
  (2.5e–05) (2.5e–05)  (2.9e–05) (2.8e–05) (2.5e–05) (2.5e–05) 
Rented rangeland area  2.2e–05  6.0e–05*  –5.8e–05  –4.0e–05  1.4e–05  –6.5e–05** 
  (3.1e–05) (3.1e–05)  (3.7e–05) (3.6e–05) (3.2e–05) (3.2e–05) 
Cattle quantity  7.3e–04**  –9.4e–04***  –8.9e–04**  3.7e–04  2.4e–04  –4.2e–04 
  (3.3e–04) (3.3e–04)  (3.9e–04) (3.8e–04) (3.4e–04) (3.5e–04) 
–0.002 –0.002  0.001  0.003 –3.1e–04  –0.001  Optimal–actual bush   
  cover deviation  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Erongo 0.697*  –0.409  0.145  –1.223***  0.287  0.219 
  (0.389) (0.393)  (0.463) (0.440) (0.398) (0.405) 
Hardap/Karas –0.445  0.150  –0.573  –0.271  –0.450  –0.339 
  (0.469) (0.472)  (0.555) (0.536) (0.478) (0.486) 
Khomas –0.036  0.057  –0.021  –0.288  –0.117  0.340 
  (0.238) (0.239)  (0.282) (0.271) (0.242) (0.245) 
Kunene –0.053  0.327  –0.151  –0.543  0.212  0.192 
  (0.305) (0.306)  (0.361) (0.346) (0.310) (0.315) 
Omaheke –0.183  –0.194  –0.270  0.804***  0.064  –0.070 
  (0.229) (0.230)  (0.271) (0.257) (0.234) (0.237) 
Oshikoto –0.267  –0.453  0.578  0.606  –0.011  0.498 
  (0.604) (0.606)  (0.713) (0.688) (0.615) (0.623) 
Rangeland size increase    0.596***  0.033  0.043  0.042  –0.020 
   (0.053)  (0.077)  (0.075)  (0.067)  (0.068) 
Spatial diversification  0.591***    0.067  0.206***  0.004  0.142** 
 (0.052)    (0.077)  (0.073)  (0.066)  (0.067) 
Resting rangeland  0.023  0.048    2.6e–04  0.133**  –0.051 
 (0.055)  (0.056)    (0.063)  (0.056)  (0.057) 
Additional feed  0.033  0.160***  2.8e–04    0.054  –0.033 
 (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.068)    (0.058)  (0.059) 
Breed adaptation  0.041  0.004  0.180**  0.068    0.326*** 
  (0.064) (0.065)  (0.075) (0.073)    (0.063) 
–0.019 0.134**  –0.067  –0.040 0.316***    Production system 
adaptation  (0.063) (0.063)  (0.075) (0.072) (0.061)   
           38













Constant 1.306*  –0.235  3.102***  3.065***  1.718**  2.035*** 
  (0.701) (0.710)  (0.810) (0.781) (0.711) (0.718) 
Adjusted R
2  0.394 0.424  0.058 0.126 0.104 0.136 
F–statistic  7.468 8.343  1.615 2.435 2.162 2.563 
Model  significance  0.000 0.000  0.034 0.000 0.001 0.000 






   39
Table 7: Impact of personal norms on management with regional averages (reg. avr.) of management and 
interaction effects. For brevity sake, abbreviations of management strategies, as indicated in the table header, are 
used. OLS regressions, coefficients with standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 




















Ecosystem norm  226.917  162.589  54.092  52.695  –23.475  116.911 
 (138.691)  (165.166)  (326.528)  (36.105)  (119.537)  (287.491) 
Income norm  –1.3e–05  –1.9e–05  –2.6e–05  –2.8e–07  2.2e–05  4.7e–06 
 (1.3e–05)  (1.2e–05)  (5.0e–05)  (5.5e–06)  (2.0e–05)  (1.3e–05) 
Reg. avr. RSI  –2.269           
 (1.581)           
–69.299           Ecosystem norm x     
  Reg. avr. RSI  (42.128)           
4.1e–06           Income norm x    
  Reg. avr. RSI  (4.0e–06)           
Reg. avr. SD    –3.371*         
   (1.801)         
 –47.971         Ecosystem norm x     
  Reg. avr. SD    (51.492)         
 5.9e–06          Income norm x    
  Reg. avr. SD    (3.6e–06)         
Reg. avr. RR      0.285       
     (2.229)       
   –10.803      Ecosystem norm x     
  Reg. avr. RR      (70.410)       
  5.6e–06      Income norm x    
  Reg. avr. RR      (1.1e–05)       
Reg. avr. AF        –0.379     
       (23.166)     
     –10.063     Ecosystem norm x     
  Reg. avr. AF        (6.921)     
     1.1e–07     Income norm x    
  Reg. avr. AF        (1.2e–06)     
Reg. avr. BA          –0.170   
         (2.512)   
       5.838    Ecosystem norm x     
  Reg. avr. BA          (26.597)   
       –5.1e–06    Income norm x    
  Reg. avr. BA          (4.5e–06)   
Reg. avr. PSA            0.602 
           (1.551) 
        –25.070  Ecosystem norm x     
  Reg. avr. PSA            (64.083) 
        –9.4e–07  Income norm x    
  Reg. avr. PSA            (3.0e–06) 
Female –0.377  –0.748  1.366*  –0.121  1.156*  0.606 
 (0.747)  (0.762)  (0.714)  (0.715)  (0.620)  (0.655) 
Age –0.006  0.017  0.005  0.018  0.010  0.013 
 (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Farm experience  –0.021  –0.016  0.021  –0.018  –0.008  0.005 
 (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Afrikaans 0.552**  0.138  0.519**  0.157  0.161  0.179 
 (0.271)  (0.263)  (0.245)  (0.244)  (0.213)  (0.226) 
Low education  0.203  0.433  0.466  0.518*  0.368  –0.034 
 (0.341)  (0.318)  (0.289)  (0.290)  (0.253)  (0.268) 
Household size  0.018  0.023  0.137*  0.048  0.088  –0.004 
 (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.081)  (0.082)  (0.070)  (0.074)   40




















Single ownership  –0.025  0.122  0.215  0.095  –0.266  –0.270 
 (0.290)  (0.287)  (0.265)  (0.264)  (0.231)  (0.246) 
Rangeland area  4.7e–05  1.4e–04***  1.0e–04*** 6.6e–06  7.5e–05**  6.7e–05* 
 (4.3e–05)  (4.3e–05)  (4.0e–05)  (4.0e–05)  (3.4e–05)  (3.7e–05) 
Rented rangeland area  3.6e–05  8.4e–05*  –3.5e–05  –2.7e–05  –2.2e–05  –1.9e–05 
 (4.6e–05)  (4.7e–05)  (4.3e–05)  (4.3e–05)  (3.8e–05)  (4.0e–05) 
Cattle quantity  3.8e–04  –1.3e–03**  –1.8e–03*** 4.1e–04  –4.6e–04  –2.1e–04 
 (5.3e–04)  (5.3e–04)  (4.9e–04)  (4.9e–04)  (4.3e–04)  (4.6e–04) 
–0.007 –0.006  0.005  0.004 –0.001 –0.002  Optimal-actual bush  
  cover deviation  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Erongo 0.467  –1.246  –0.900  –2.199  –0.332  0.134 
  (0.614) (0.767)  (0.580)  (26.852) (0.528) (0.670) 
Hardap/Karas 0.805  1.318  –0.180  –1.333  –0.738  –0.065 
  (1.109) (1.298)  (0.858)  (32.867) (1.264) (1.635) 
Khomas –0.831  –0.863  0.069  –0.181  –0.422  0.095 
 (0.805)  (0.726)  (0.342)  (6.106)  (0.768)  (0.438) 
Kunene –0.595  0.118  –0.652  –0.710  0.268  0.275 
 (0.657)  (0.487)  (0.434)  (7.751)  (0.525)  (0.416) 
Omaheke –0.361  –1.177*  –0.403  1.249  –0.376  –0.034 
  (0.351) (0.665)  (0.372)  (20.411) (0.497) (0.284) 
Constant 10.770**  12.690**  1.780  5.089  4.480  0.434 
 (5.218)  (5.763)  (10.098)  (106.801)  (11.414)  (6.850) 
Adjusted R
2 0.066  0.051  0.074  0.106  –0.012  –0.035 
F–statistic 1.594  1.483  1.731  2.084  0.895  0.694 
Model significance  0.057  0.089  0.030  0.005  0.598  0.836 
Observations 177  190  194  194  193  193 
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Table 8: Impact of personal norms on management, with regional averages (reg. avr.) of personal norms and 
interaction effects. For brevity sake, abbreviations of personal norms are used for regional averages and in 
interaction effects, as indicated. OLS regressions, coefficients with standard errors in brackets. Significance 
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 













Ecosystem norm [EN]  92.577  87.279  44.258  53.929  4.649  –20.460 
  (71.531) (69.955)  (36.567) (36.646) (31.905) (33.857) 
Income norm [IN]  1.1e–07  –5.7e–06  4.8e–07  2.6e–06  1.4e–06  1.6e–07 
  (6.0e–06) (6.2e–06)  (5.7e–06) (5.8e–06) (5.1e–06) (5.3e–06) 
Reg. avr. EN  34.910  41.764  –6.391  –21.343  15.853  –6.807 
  (32.411) (32.770)  (30.386) (30.452) (26.551) (28.041) 
Reg. avr. IN  –1.7e–06  –4.0e–06  –4.7e–06  1.8e–05*** –3.9e–06  –1.6e–06 
  (6.9e–06) (6.8e–06)  (6.2e–06) (6.2e–06) (5.4e–06) (5.7e–06) 
EN x Reg. avr. EN  –3.3e–04  –2.8e–04  –1.3e–04  –1.7e–04  –6.8e–06  7.9e–05 
  (2.5e–04) (2.5e–04)  (1.2e–04) (1.2e–04) (1.0e–04) (1.1e–04) 
IN x Reg. avr. IN  4.5e–06  6.3e–05  –9.8e–06  –2.8e–05  –2.3e–05  4.5e–06 
  (7.2e–05) (7.3e–05)  (6.8e–05) (6.8e–05) (6.0e–05) (6.3e–05) 
Female –0.358  –0.770  1.460**  –0.101  1.140*  0.570 
  (0.753) (0.768)  (0.713) (0.715) (0.623) (0.658) 
Age  –0.009 0.007  0.005 0.018 0.011 0.012 
  (0.018) (0.017)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) 
Farm experience  –0.016  –0.008  0.022*  –0.018  –0.008  0.006 
  (0.015) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) 
Afrikaans 0.567**  0.144  0.510**  0.163  0.140  0.172 
  (0.273) (0.264)  (0.245) (0.245) (0.213) (0.226) 
Low  education  0.220  0.349  0.495* 0.520* 0.340 –0.055 
  (0.343) (0.319)  (0.289) (0.289) (0.253) (0.266) 
Household size  0.022  0.013  0.149*  0.052  0.094  –0.013 
  (0.088) (0.088)  (0.081) (0.082) (0.071) (0.075) 
Single ownership  –0.099  0.010  0.221  0.104  –0.268  –0.297 
  (0.291) (0.286)  (0.265) (0.265) (0.233) (0.244) 
Rangeland area  3.9e–05  1.2e–04***  1.1e–04*** 9.6e–06  7.5e–05**  6.3e–05* 
  (4.4e–05) (4.3e–05)  (4.0e–05) (4.0e–05) (3.5e–05) (3.7e–05) 
Rented  rangeland  area  4.5e–05  9.2e–05* –3.3e–05 –2.9e–05 –2.1e–05 –1.9e–05 
  (4.7e–05) (4.7e–05)  (4.3e–05) (4.3e–05) (3.8e–05) (4.0e–05) 
Cattle quantity  4.2e–04  –1.2e–03**  –1.8e–03*** 4.0e–04  –4.8e–04  –2.0e–04 
  (5.4e–04) (5.3e–04)  (4.9e–04) (4.9e–04) (4.3e–04) (4.6e–04) 
–0.007 –0.005  0.007  0.004 –0.002 –0.003  Optimal–actual bush  
  cover deviation  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Erongo 1.423  1.025  –1.399  –2.039*  –0.043  –0.029 
  (1.128) (1.154)  (1.073) (1.075) (0.950) (0.990) 
Hardap/Karas 2.078  3.162*  –0.289  –2.710*  0.404  –0.530 
  (1.606) (1.636)  (1.514) (1.517) (1.320) (1.397) 
Khomas 0.305  0.325  –0.161  0.067  –0.150  –0.012 
  (0.406) (0.404)  (0.369) (0.370) (0.322) (0.344) 
Kunene 0.006  0.234  –0.881*  –0.144  0.106  0.284 
  (0.577) (0.556)  (0.513) (0.514) (0.448) (0.474) 
Constant 0.469  –0.454  4.863  –0.006  3.293  4.290 
  (3.341) (3.381)  (3.128) (3.135) (2.736) (2.890) 
Adjusted R
2 0.054  0.042  0.079  0.106  –0.018  –0.033 
F–statistic  1.475 1.390  1.784 2.094 0.836 0.709 
Model  significance  0.094 0.129  0.023 0.005 0.672 0.820 
Observations  177 190  194 194 193 193 
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